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I.

INTRODUCTION

Amid a contentious presidential election, a global pandemic,
and a national reckoning on race relations, a nurse working in an
immigrant detention facility in Georgia filed a whistleblower
complaint, alleging that doctors were performing forced
hysterectomies on detained immigrant women.1 This news shocked
the country, and many members of Congress demanded an
investigation by the Department of Homeland Security.2 Outraged,
*Brooke Pamela Payton, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC Law School.
Thank you to everyone who has supported me during law school and beyond:
particularly Greg, Stephanie, Miles, and my parents. A special thank you to
Professor Samuel Olken, Chelsea Button, and the Law Review staff for their
time and efforts in shaping my comment.
1. Rachel Treisman, Whistleblower Alleges ‘Medical Neglect,’ Questionable
Hysterectomies
Of
ICE
Detainees,
NPR
(Sept.
16,
2020),
www.npr.org/2020/09/16/913398383/whistleblower-alleges-medical-neglectquestionable-hysterectomies-of-ice-detaine [perma.cc/6R6S-2DNA].
2. These members of Congress include House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House
Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, Congressional Hispanic Caucus Chairman
Joaquin Castro, Senator Cory Booker, and Senator Richard Blumenthal. Press
Release, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Whistleblower Complaint
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House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said, “[i]f true, the appalling
conditions described in the whistleblower complaint, including
allegations of mass hysterectomies being performed on vulnerable
immigrant women, are a staggering abuse of human rights.”3
Unfortunately, this horrific news merely illustrates the most recent
example in a long history of denying women, particularly women of
color, their right to reproductive justice in the United States.4
“Reproductive justice” is an umbrella term that encompasses a
countless number of decisions that women make about their own
bodily autonomy.5 Deborah Reid, a noted health policy attorney and
defender of reproductive rights, explained:
[T]he concept of reproductive justice . . . is firmly rooted in a human
rights framework that supports the ability of all women to make and
direct their own reproductive decisions. These decisions could include
obtaining contraception, abortion, sterilization, and/or maternity
care. Accompanying that right is the obligation of the government
and larger society to create laws, policies, and systems conducive to
supporting those decisions.6

This Comment will focus on the rights of immigrant women to
exercise their right to abortion in the United States. However, it
should be noted that the effects of these rights impact women from
all walks of life. Part II will provide a brief overview of the history
of laws and seminal decisions involving reproductive justice, and it
will introduce Jane Doe, an undocumented immigrant minor who

on Massive Health Care Abuse at ICE Detention Centers (Sept. 15, 2020),
www.speaker.gov/newsroom/91520-0
[perma.cc/H2XE-K5X3]
[hereinafter
Pelosi Statement]; Press Release, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, Hoyer
Statement on ICE Whistleblower Complaint (Sept. 15, 2020),
www.majorityleader.gov/content/hoyer-statement-ice-whistleblower-complaint
[perma.cc/H8T6-5BAP]; Press Release, Congressional Hispanic Caucus
Chairman Joaquin Castro, Congressional Hispanic Caucus Statement on
Whistleblower Complaint of Abuse in ICE Detention Centers, Including
Hysterectomies (Sept. 15, 2020), www.chc.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/congressional-hispanic-caucus-statement-on-whistleblowercomplaint-of [perma.cc/S6KM-AGFS]; Letter from Senator Cory Booker to Hon.
Joseph Cuffari, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (Sept. 15,
2020),
www.booker.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/9.15.20%20Letter%20to%20DHS%20OI
G%20re%20GA%20Whistleblower%20Complaint%20FINAL%20SIGNED%20(
002).pdf [perma.cc/L4NS-E9YR]; Richard Blumenthal (@SenBlumenthal),
T WITTER
(Sept.
15,
2020,
5:07
PM),
www.twitter.com/SenBlumenthal/status/1305991708887445504
[perma.cc/3UJW-WHMR].
3. Pelosi Statement, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Deborah Reid, Reproductive Justice Advocates: Don’t Roll Back
Sterilization Consent Rules, R EWIRE N EWS G ROUP (Apr. 2, 2014)
www.rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2014/04/02/reproductive-justice-advocatesdont-roll-back-sterilization-consent-rules/ [perma.cc/X2XQ-RPGS].
6. Id.
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sought an abortion while in U.S. immigration custody.7 The
Comment will then explain the background of Doe’s case and two
important aspects of abortion jurisprudence in this country: the
Mootness Doctrine and the undue burden standard. Part III will
discuss the arguments for and against preserving abortion access
for immigrant women, take an in-depth look at the decisions in Jane
Doe’s case, and analyze the potentially serious ramifications of
those decisions. Part IV will propose how a different Supreme Court
decision could have set the tone for a country where reproductive
justice is protected, and women’s bodily autonomy is secure.

II. BACKGROUND
Part A of this section will provide a brief history of reproductive
rights in the United States. Parts B and C will explain the two
doctrines that are essential for understanding abortion
jurisprudence: the Mootness Doctrine and the undue burden
standard. Part D will describe the Office of Refugee Resettlement,
where this story takes place. Finally, Part E will introduce Jane Doe
and her fight for her own bodily autonomy. This section will place
Doe’s case in the larger constitutional history of abortion
jurisprudence by discussing the case’s journey through the court
system, all the way up to the United States Supreme Court.

A. A Brief History of Reproductive Rights in the U.S.
Historically, reproductive decisions have been stripped away
from women of color, disabled women, and immigrant women, to
name just a few groups affected.8 These civil rights violations have
been inextricably woven into the laws and social norms of our
country, to the point where it has oftentimes felt normal to deny
women basic human rights.9
In 1907, Indiana passed the first eugenics10 law, which
mandated sterilization for “criminals, idiots, rapists, and
imbeciles.”11 More than thirty states quickly followed suit.12 In
7. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (LeCraft Henderson,
J., dissenting).
8. Reid, supra note 5.
9. What’s going on in the fight over US abortion rights?, BBC (June 14,
2019), www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47940659 [perma.cc/W3ZU-AG6V]
[hereinafter What’s going on?].
10. See Eugenics, HISTORY (Oct. 8, 2019), www.history.com/topics/
germany/eugenics [perma.cc/HQ4W-79SJ] (providing a definition and overview
of eugenics movements globally and in the United States).
11. Luke Kersten, Indiana passes first eugenic sterilization statute in the
United States, E UGENICS A RCHIVE , www.eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/timeline/
53234888132156674b00024e [perma.cc/RY85-HWF6] (last visited Oct. 11,
2020).
12. A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT
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1927, the United States Supreme Court declared forced sterilization
to be constitutional in a seminal case involving a mentally disabled
woman.13 As a result of that decision, more than 70,000 women were
forcibly sterilized during the twentieth century.14 Frequent targets
of forced sterilization were women of color, poor women, and women
who were thought to be mentally disabled.15
Over the last one hundred years, doctors forced sterilization on
numerous Black women to control Black birthrates.16 Due to the
frequency of this violation of Black women, this practice was termed
a “Mississippi appendectomy.”17 Additionally, poor Black women
were also chosen to be “practice” for young medical students.18 After
going to the doctor for minor surgery in 1944, Fannie Lou Hamer, a
Black woman in Mississippi, discovered the doctors also performed
a hysterectomy without her consent or knowledge.19 After this
horrendous violation, Hamer courageously became an active and
vocal member of the Civil Rights Movement and even ran for
Congress.20 Hamer’s research revealed that sixty percent of the
Black women in her community had — like her — received forced
sterilizations.21
Along with Black women, as many as fifty percent of Native
American women were forcibly sterilized without their knowledge
or consent between 1970 and 1976.22 Similarly, in Los Angeles
TO THE HUMAN GENOME ERA

ix (Paul Lombardo ed., 2011).
13. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927) (stating that women deemed
to be “feeble-minded” and promiscuous can be ordered to undergo forced
sterilization).
14. Fresh Air: The Supreme Court Ruling That Led To 70,000 Forced
Sterilizations, NPR (Mar. 7, 2016), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/
03/07/469478098/the-supreme-court-ruling-that-led-to-70-000-forcedsterilizations [perma.cc/5342-6WE8].
15. Id.
16. Clarence Spigner, Fannie Lou Hamer (1917-1977), U NIV . OF W ASH .,
www.depts.washington.edu/hservmph/articles/2070
[perma.cc/ZV4N-EXZR]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
17. See id. (noting how Fannie Lou Hamer, a Black female leader in the civil
rights movement, was a victim of forced sterilization when she underwent what
she thought was a minor surgery in a Mississippi county hospital); see also
Debra Michals, Fannie Lou Hamer: 1917-1977, NAT’L WOMEN’S HISTORY
MUSEUM
(2017),
www.womenshistory.org/educationresources/biographies/fannie-lou-hamer [perma.cc/3UWV-ZACB] (detailing the
specifics of Hamer’s procedure, including that it was supposed to be for the
removal of a uterine tumor).
18. Remembering Fannie Lou Hamer, R ESILIENT S ISTERHOOD P ROJ . (June
22, 2021), www.rsphealth.org/fannie-lou-hamer [perma.cc/WR2B-TAE7].
19. Id.
20. Fannie Lou Hamer, PBS: A M . E XPERIENCE , www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/freedomsummer-hamer [perma.cc/BR3Z-2TEH]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
21. Remembering Fannie, supra note 18.
22. Lisa Ko, Unwanted Sterilization and Eugenics Programs in the United
States, PBS (Jan. 26, 2016), www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/unwantedsterilization-and-eugenics-programs-in-the-united-states/
[perma.cc/7DTX-
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County, Mexican-American women were being coerced into forced
sterilization at alarming rates after giving birth.23
Even after a long, dark history of women being denied their
own autonomy, the laws of the United States still do not adequately
protect a woman’s right to make her own reproductive health
decisions.24 The United States Supreme Court has a demonstrated
history of ignoring, downplaying, and even outright denying the
importance of reproductive justice.25 While some progress was made
regarding abortion autonomy in Roe v. Wade,26 fifty years of
subsequent decisions have narrowed the scope of a woman’s right
to choose.27 Many wonder why we are even still debating this all
these years later.28

2DDD]; see also generally Gregory W. Rutecki, Forced Sterilization of Native
Americans: Late Twentieth Century Physician Cooperation with National
Eugenic Policies, C TR . FOR B IOETHICS & H UMAN D IGNITY (Oct. 8, 2010),
www.cbhd.org/content/forced-sterilization-native-americans-late-twentiethcentury-physician-cooperation-national- [perma.cc/F8EH-9EKW] (discussing
the history of Native women who were coerced or forced into reproductive
decisions by their physicians).
23. Renee Tajima-Peña, “Más Bebés?”: An Investigation of the Sterilization
of Mexican-American Women at Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center
during the 1960s and 70s, 11(3) S CHOLAR & F EMINIST O NLINE 1 (2013),
www.sfonline.barnard.edu/life-un-ltd-feminism-bioscience-race/mas-bebes-aninvestigation-of-the-sterilization-of-mexican-american-women-at-los-angelescounty-usc-medical-center-during-the-1960s-and-70s/ [perma.cc/BC3G-5KV5];
see also generally Madrigal v. Quilligan, 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981)
(unpublished opinion) (ruling in favor of doctors who sterilized Latina women
without their informed consent); and see also No Más Bebés (PBS television
broadcast June 14, 2015) (profiling several Latina women who were plaintiffs
in Madrigal).
24. What’s going on?, supra note 9.
25. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014)
(striking down the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, which
would have required all private employers to cover contraceptives for their
female employees).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
27. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding the Hyde
Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funding for abortions); see also
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 499 (1989) (upholding antichoice provisions, including required determinations of fetus viability and
prohibition on abortions in public buildings); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 203 (1991) (upholding the Reagan era “gag rule” that prevented clinic staff
from discussing all options available to pregnant women, not just prenatal
care); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. P.A. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880, 883,
899 (1992) (holding that a twenty-four-hour waiting period, parental consent
for minors, and required viewing of the fetus was constitutional); and see also
Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3381 (2015) (holding that
the first-ever federal ban on abortion methods was constitutional).
28. Alexandra Svokos, Viral Photo Of Woman’s Abortion Protest Sign Will
Make You Laugh Then Cry, E LITE D AILY (Oct. 4, 2016), www.elitedaily.com/
news/politics/woman-abortion-protest-poland/1632496 [perma.cc/LBP7-3XDY].
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B. The Mootness Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court does not review the decisions for
every single lower court that comes up on appeal.29 In fact, the
Court is quite strategic in choosing the limited number of cases it
hears.30 One of the ways the Court flushes out cases that do not
require its review is by checking to see if they are moot.31
Essentially, the Court does not review a case “when the issues
presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.”32 The Court requires that “an actual
controversy . . . exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but
through all stages of the litigation.”33 This has “long been settled”
for all federal courts.34 In fact, even “[i]f an intervening
circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the
outcome of the lawsuit . . . ’ at any point during litigation, the action
can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.”35 This
mootness doctrine “ensures that the Federal Judiciary confines
itself to its constitutionally limited role of adjudicating actual and
concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have direct consequences
on the parties involved.”36
However, in Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion in Roe,
he outlined an exception to this long-settled doctrine.37 He wrote:
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation,
the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the
pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is
complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation
seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review
will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy
often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general
population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy
provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non[-]mootness. It
truly could be ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’38

Essentially, if the issue involves pregnancy or abortion, the

29. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87-9 (5th ed. 2016).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. L.A. Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498 (1969)).
33. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1975 (2016)
(quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90-1 (2013)).
34. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)
(quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).
35. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016) (quoting
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)).
36. Genesis Healthcare, 569 U.S. at 71.
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 123.
38. Id. at 125 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911)).
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Court cannot dismiss the case on mootness grounds.39 This
exception was written into the fabric of the seminal case that
established a woman’s constitutional right to access an abortion.40

C. The Undue Burden Standard
In 1983, ten years after Roe, the Supreme Court decided City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.41 In her Akron
dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor introduced a new standard
of review to replace the strict scrutiny test of Roe.42 In Roe, the strict
scrutiny test classified abortion as a fundamental right of privacy,
just like marriage, conception, family relationships, and childrearing.43 However, in her dissent, Justice O’Connor created the
undue burden standard.44 She wrote that “[o]ur recent cases
indicate that a regulation imposed on ‘a lawful abortion ‘is not
unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion.’’”45 As long as the particular regulation does not unduly
burden a woman’s ability to access an abortion, such as requiring
waiting periods or outside consent, then the court will only review
the regulation as it “rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose.”46 However, this was only a dissenting opinion, so the new
standard was not the law of the land.47
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Se. P.A. v. Casey, Justice
O’Connor saw her chance.48 The majority opinion formally replaced
the strict scrutiny standard of Roe with the undue burden
standard.49 First, though, she reiterated that the core of Roe was
still established precedent:
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe’s essential
holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a
recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the
State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to
support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
40. Id.
41. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 169.
43. Id. at 152-53.
44. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 453 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 431 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) (quoting
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1977))).
46. Akron, 462 U.S. at 453.
47. See David Cole, The Power of a Supreme Court Dissent, W ASH . P OST
(Oct. 29, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-power-of-a-supremecourt-dissent/2015/10/29/fbc80acc-66cb-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html
[perma.cc/ABM6-T6AZ] (explaining the historic impact of Supreme Court
dissents and how they can act as building blocks for later majority opinions).
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
49. Id. The test that O’Connor introduced in her Akron dissent was a more
deferential standard than the one employed in the Casey opinion.
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obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.50

Justice O’Connor further explained that “[o]nly where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make
this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”51 However, “[t]he very
notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life”
means that not every regulation will be struck down because “[n]ot
all burdens on the right . . . will be undue.” 52 This was the Court’s
way of balancing both the State’s interests in protecting life and the
woman’s constitutional right to make decisions about her own
body.53 She further described that “[a] finding of an undue burden
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”54 A statute may
inform a woman’s free choice or, in other words, attempt to persuade
her to choose childbirth over abortion, but the statute may not
hinder that choice.55 Any statute that places a “substantial obstacle”
in a woman’s path to getting an abortion is not a permissible means
to even legitimate ends.56 In the same case, Justice John Paul
Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, added that “[a]
burden may be ‘undue’ either because [it] is too severe or because it
lacks a legitimate, rational justification.” 57 Since the adoption of the
undue burden standard in Casey, the Supreme Court continues to
use the standard in all abortion cases it reviews.58

D. Problems Inside the Office of Refugee Resettlement
To fully understand these doctrines as they relate to Jane Doe,
it is necessary to discuss the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(“ORR”). Created in 1980 within the Department of Health and
Human Services, ORR was intended to support U.S. policies of
providing a safe haven for immigrants with “special humanitarian

50. Id. at 846.
51. Id. at 874.
52. Id. at 876.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 877.
55. Id. at 877, 886.
56. Id. at 877, 885.
57. Id. at 920.
58. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016)
(striking down requirements for clinics to have hospital admitting privileges
and hospital-grade facilities; Breyer, J. writing that “[e]ach [of the two
requirements] places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a
pre[-]viability abortion, each constitutes an undue burden on abortion access,
and each violates the Federal Constitution.”) (citations omitted); see also June
Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020) (reaffirming the undue
burden caused by a Louisiana law that was almost identical to the Texas law
from Hellerstedt).
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concern[s].”59 Since its creation, this office has been tasked with
resettling nearly three million refugees,60 with 2019 recording the
largest number of unaccompanied immigrant children in ORR’s
history.61 That number represents a significant increase from
earlier this decade, largely due to President Donald Trump’s
executive order to separate parents and children apprehended at
the U.S.-Mexico border.62 However, ORR shelters are not safe places
for these children, as there have been numerous reports of abuse
and neglect of the children who temporarily reside there.63 Between
2014 and 2018, ORR shelters reported more than 4,500 allegations
of sexual abuse and harassment.64 In addition, ORR shelters have
been described as “goldmine[s]” for child sexual predators.65 Yet, no
meaningful action taken to solve these problems has been very
successful.66
When Jane Doe was housed in ORR’s shelters, the Director of
the Office was Scott Lloyd.67 Before being appointed by President
59. History, O FF . OF R EFUGEE R ESETTLEMENT (Mar. 16, 2020),
www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/history [perma.cc/Y3C4-NS7P].
60. Id.
61. Teresa Mathew, “They Feel Like They Are Being Jailed”, S LATE (Aug.
13,
2019),
www.slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/orr-sheltersunaccompanied-migrant-children-abuse.html [perma.cc/7NH3-EDBL].
62. Alexandra Schwartz, The Office of Refugee Resettlement Is Completely
Unprepared for the Thousands of Immigrant Children Now in Its Care, N EW
Y ORKER (June 21, 2018), www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-office-ofrefugee-resettlement-is-completely-unprepared-for-the-thousands-ofimmigrant-children-now-in-its-care [perma.cc/LRU7-WJDH]; see also John
Cassidy, Why a Rogue President Was Forced to Back Down on Family
Separation, N EW Y ORKER (June 21, 2018), www.newyorker.com/news/ourcolumnists/why-a-rogue-president-was-forced-to-back-down-on-familyseparation [perma.cc/B939-8JTW] (discussing the reversal of the childseparation executive order).
63. Mathew, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. Michael Grabell & Topher Sanders, Immigrant Youth Shelters: “If You’re
a Predator, It’s a Gold Mine”, P RO P UBLICA (July 27, 2018),
www.propublica.org/article/immigrant-youth-shelters-sexual-abuse-fightsmissing-children [perma.cc/G9U2-H97D].
66. Id.; see also Priscilla Alvarez, Government watchdog finds ineffective
safety measures for children in custody, CNN (June 18, 2020),
www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/office-of-refugee-resettlement-safetychildren-custody/index.html [perma.cc/V3LK-AZWG] (discussing reports of
confusion within immigration services about how to best protect children in
custody (“With ORR, when we seek help, we get different answers.”)); and see
also Letter from Carla Smith, Freedom of Information Office, to William F.
Marshall, Judicial Watch (Aug. 5, 2021), www.judicialwatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/JW-v-HHS-UACs-August-2021-01190.pdf
[perma.cc/HQ9K-6S7V] (documenting thirty-three incidents of sexual abuse
during a one-month span in the beginning of 2021).
67. Adam Cancryn & Renuka Rayasam, Meet the anti-abortion Trump
appointee taking care of separated kids, P OLITICO (June 21, 2018),
www.politico.com/story/2018/06/21/scott-lloyd-anti-abortion-separated-kids642094 [perma.cc/7XNP-F24L].
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Trump, Lloyd worked to pass anti-abortion laws in six states68 and
wrote articles describing “dismemberment abortions”69 and “Big
Abortion[’]s (sic) evolving profit structure.”70 During Lloyd’s lessthan-two-year tenure at ORR, he was known for enacting strict
anti-abortion policies as well.71 One existing policy allowed women
in ORR custody to seek abortions in the case of rape or incest, but
Lloyd immediately overrode that when he came into office and
mandated that all abortion requests needed to be approved by him
personally.72 Lloyd’s policy stated that shelter personnel were
“prohibited from taking any action that facilitates an abortion
without direction and approval from the Director of ORR.”73
Unsurprisingly, abortion requests sent to him for approval were
rarely, if ever, granted.74 Lloyd was eventually fired after “internal
emails . . . revealed that Lloyd devoted an outsize share of his time
to micromanaging the abortion requests of teen girls in his custody
– a tiny fraction of the individuals for which [ORR] is responsible.”75
While Lloyd was well-known for these policies in immigration
centers,76 his office was not the only one responsible for such acts.77
After being released from Border Patrol custody, women have
reported being “repeatedly slammed against . . . chain link fence[s]”
while pregnant or suffering miscarriages without receiving any
68. Id.
69. Scott Lloyd, Banning Dismemberment Abortions: Constitutionality &
Politics, 41 HUM. LIFE REV. 11 (2015).
70. Cancryn & Rayasam, supra note 67; Scott Lloyd, Does Contraception
Really
Prevent
Abortion?,
FEDERALIST
(Aug.
18,
2015),
www.thefederalist.com/2015/08/18/does-contraception-really-prevent-abortions
[perma.cc/39C3-TSSF].
71. Roque Planas & Elise Foley, Anti-Abortion Crusader Scott Lloyd Out At
Refugee Resettlement Agency, H UFFINGTON P OST (Nov. 19, 2018),
www.huffpost.com/entry/anti-abortion-crusader-scott-lloyd-pushed-out-ofrefugee-resettlement-agency_n_5bf34051e4b0d9e7283c4652 [perma.cc/9YM72DJW] (Lloyd was the Director of ORR from March 2017 to November 2018).
72. Cancryn & Rayasam, supra note 67; see also id. (stating how, in one
instance, Lloyd ordered a girl who had taken one of two pills needed to complete
her requested abortion to undergo medical consultations to see if the procedure,
which had already started, could be reversed).
73. Hargan 874 F.3d at 744 (LeCraft Henderson, J., dissenting).
74. Tessa Stuart, The Health Department’s Christian Crusade, R OLLING
S TONE (Oct. 24, 2018), www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/healthand-human-services-abortion-policies-738904/ [perma.cc/L2FJ-V7GF].
75. Tessa Stuart, Trump’s Anti-Abortion Refugee Program Chief Has Been
Removed From His Post, R OLLING S TONE
(Nov. 19, 2018),
www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/scott-lloyd-removed-o-r-r-755468/
[perma.cc/39RZ-X5Q6].
76.
MSNBC
(@MSNBC),
TWITTER
(Mar.
15,
2019),
www.twitter.com/MSNBC/status/1106746641736970240
[perma.cc/FFA4JRXR].
77. Brigitte Amiri, Reproductive Abuse is Rampant in the Immigration
Detention System, ACLU (Sept. 23, 2020), www.aclu.org/news/immigrantsrights/reproductive-abuse-is-rampant-in-the-immigration-detention-system/
[perma.cc/444P-TK4S].
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hygiene products or medical care.78 One woman recounted how, in
April 2020, she was forced to give birth in a Border Patrol station
while standing and still wearing pants, after repeatedly asking for
help and telling agents how much pain she was in.79 Since these
women have come forward, the ACLU has filed several lawsuits
against various immigration agencies for the “heinous abuse or
neglect” of pregnant women.80

E. The Plight of Pregnant Immigrant Minor, Jane Doe
One of the dozens of women to come forward was Jane Doe.
Doe was only seventeen years old when she attempted to cross the
U.S.-Mexico border as an unaccompanied minor.81 In an attempt to
protect her anonymity, very little information is publicly available
about Doe’s life before her confinement, except that she experienced
“life-threatening physical abuse” and therefore could not return
home to her family.82 She, like many other refugees, made the
decision to come to the United States in search of a better life.83 On
September 7, 2017, she was taken into custody by U.S. border patrol
agents and sent to a federally-funded immigration shelter run by
the ORR in Texas.84 During a routine physical examination in ORR
custody, she was informed that she was eight weeks pregnant, and
she requested an abortion.85
Her request for an abortion was denied by ORR Director Scott
Lloyd.86 Through her guardian ad litem,87 Rochelle Garza, Doe
78. Id.
79. Ema O’Connor, A Woman Gave Birth In A Border Patrol Station Still
Wearing Her Pants. Now The Agents Involved Are Being Accused Of Abuse.,
B UZZFEED
N EWS
(Apr.
9,
2020),
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emaoconnor/pregnant-woman-birth-borderpatrol-aclu-complaint [perma.cc/CK7Y-KM5A].
80. Id.; see also Letter from Monika Y. Langarica, ACLU San Diego, to
Joseph V. Caffari, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (Apr. 8, 2020),
www.s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6827805/2020-04-07-OIG-Cmplt-FinalRedacted.pdf [perma.cc/3RXT-45YZ] (outlining the ACLU’s lawsuit on behalf of
the woman who gave birth standing up and while wearing pants in Border
Patrol custody).
81. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 741-43.
82. Id. at 742.
83. Id. at 743.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 744.
86. After a Month of Obstruction by the Trump Administration, Jane Doe
Gets Her Abortion, ACLU (Oct. 25, 2017), www.aclu.org/press-releases/aftermonth-obstruction-trump-administration-jane-doe-gets-her-abortion
[perma.cc/A5BT-Q74D]. In Jane Doe’s own words: “[T]hey have not allowed me
to leave to get an abortion.” Id.
87. A guardian ad litem, or GAL for short, is an attorney that a court
appoints to watch after someone during a case. Guardian Ad Litem, L EGAL
I NFO . I NST ., www.law.cornell.edu/wex/guardian_ad_litem (last visited Oct. 11,
2020). They will help the court be informed to make decisions for someone
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commenced an action against Health and Human Services
Secretary Eric Hargan88 in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia.89 The suit challenged the constitutionality of ORR’s
new abortion policy and sought to enjoin the ORR to allow Doe to
have the abortion.90 On October 18, 2017, Judge Tanya Chutkan
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), allowing Doe to
obtain an abortion immediately.91
On October 19, 2017, Doe attended pre-abortion counseling
with the doctor who would perform her abortion in order to fulfill
the requirements of Texas state abortion laws.92 At this clinic, Doe
had to wait a full week before actually obtaining her abortion.93 This
waiting period allowed the government to file an appeal to the Court
of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit.94 On October 20, 2017, a panel of
three judges of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
District Court’s decision, saying that the ORR policy was not an
undue burden.95
Upon reversal, Doe immediately requested a rehearing en
banc.96 In support of Doe, numerous organizations and states
submitted amicus curiae briefs arguing that the ORR policy placed
an undue burden on women’s rights to choose an abortion.97 On

without full capacity, usually someone who is mentally disabled or someone who
is a child. Id. In this case, Jane Doe was a child, so Rochelle Garza of the ACLU
was appointed by the court as her GAL. See generally Hargan, 874 F.3d at 735
(showing the parties as including Rochelle Garza as GAL for Jane Doe); see also
generally Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018) (also showing the parties as
including Rochelle Garza as GAL for Jane Doe).
88. Eric Hargan served as Secretary of Health and Human Services from
October 2017 until January 2018, when he was replaced by Alex Azar. Dan
Mangan, Former drug-company executive Alex Azar sworn in as Trump’s new
healthcare chief, CNBC (Jan. 29, 2018), www.cnbc.com/2018/01/29/watch-alexazar-sworn-in-as-trumps-new-health-care-chief.html [perma.cc/CFS2-KBWD].
Thus, the opposing party in Jane Doe’s case switches from Hargan to Azar
between the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
89. Hargan 874 F.3d at 744.
90. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1791.
91. Garza v. Hargan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175415.
92. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792.
93. Id. This is because the doctors at this clinic rotated on a weekly basis,
meaning the doctor that Doe attended counseling with would not be on shift for
another seven days. Id.
94. Azar v. Garza, SCOTUS BLOG , www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
azar-v-garza [perma.cc/JA8S-RE2U] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
95. Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-5236, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20711 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 20, 2017); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (explaining the undue burden
standard); and see also Margaret Talbot, The Supreme Court’s Just Application
of the Undue-Burden Standard for Abortion, N EW Y ORKER (June 27, 2016),
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-supreme-courts-just-application-ofthe-undue-burden-standard-for-abortion [perma.cc/M9ZV-LEJF] (agreeing
with the way the court used the undue burden standard in Hellerstedt).
96. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 735.
97. Id. at 736. These states include California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawai’i, Illinois, Main, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
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October 24, 2017, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed
and remanded the matter back to the District Court.98 On that same
day, Judge Chutkan once again ordered the government to allow
Doe to get an abortion.99 Finally, on October 25, 2017, at 4:15 a.m.,
Doe successfully obtained an abortion.100 But her legal journey did
not end, as the government still appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.101 On June 4, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the en banc order, and remanded the case back to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to dismiss the claim as moot.102

III. ANALYSIS
This section will discuss arguments regarding abortion access
for immigrant women. It will explain the decision of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Garza v. Hargan103 and then finally review the
Supreme Court’s decision.

A. Arguments For Preserving Abortion Access for
Immigrant Women
Abortion accessibility advocates would say clearly and
unequivocally that reproductive rights are human rights,104 which
include “the right to make decisions about one’s life and family, to
access necessary reproductive health services, and to decide
whether and when to have children.”105 According to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the United States must provide the
same human rights and protections for all people within its borders,
regardless of citizenship or immigration status.106 The Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ensure that these
rights extend to all “person[s]” in the United States, and neither

Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. Id.
98. Id. at 742, 745.
99. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1793. See Part IV for a further explanation of the Court’s
reasoning for this action. Doe had already obtained her abortion by the time her
case reached the Supreme Court. Id.
103. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 735.
104. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S.
171,
www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
[perma.cc/HKY8-A6UK].
105. Brief of Reproductive Rights, Health, and Justice Organizations and
Allied Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees and Affirmance
at 5, Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (2017) (No. 18-5093) [hereinafter Amici
Brief].
106. Felipe González Morales, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
human rights of migrants, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/41 (May 4, 2018),
www.right-docs.org/doc/a-hrc-38-41/ [perma.cc/3SWM-AYMU].

2022] The Supreme Mistake: When a Choice is Really No Choice at All

81

make any specification as to immigration status.107 The Supreme
Court has affirmed this principle, holding that “[a]liens, even aliens
whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.”108 Since the Supreme Court has
ruled that access to an abortion is a constitutional right for all
women, it should follow that this right naturally extends to
immigrant and non-citizen women on U.S. soil as well.109
Defenders of abortion access for immigrant women would
argue that the mootness doctrine does not apply to this case because
it involves pregnancy and abortion.110 Humans have a gestation
time that is approximately 268 days,111 which is roughly the same
amount of time it takes for a case to be heard and then decided by
the Supreme Court.112 However, this 268-day timeline does not take
into account the amount of time it can take for a case to even reach
the Supreme Court in the first place.113 Clearly, by the time that a
case involving pregnancy or abortion finally reaches the Court, the
issue will have been resolved one way or another, just due to the
passage of time.114 If it weren’t for this mootness exception, the
Supreme Court would be unable to hear any cases involving
pregnancy or abortion, and the courts’ doors would be closed to an
entire population of potential plaintiffs.115 Without access to the
court system, women like Jane Doe have nowhere to turn to remedy
a serious violation of their civil rights.116
In addition to the mootness issue, a significant part of the
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence involves the undue burden
standard.117 The government, in enacting an abortion-related
regulation, cannot place a “substantial obstacle” in the way of a
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
108. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
109. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
110. Id. at 124-25.
111. An Oxford study found this to be the median time from ovulation to
birth, although the gestational length range was thirty-seven days. A.M. Jukic
et al., Length of human pregnancy and contributors to its natural variation,
28(10) HUM. R EPRODUCTION 2848 (2013).
112. Dr. Adam Feldman, Crunching Data From this Past Term, E MPIRICAL
SCOTUS (Aug. 20, 2017), www.empiricalscotus.com/crunching-data/
[perma.cc/QS94-X298].
113. Vox, How a case gets to the US Supreme Court, Y OU T UBE (Mar. 28,
2017), www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEjgAXxrkXY [perma.cc/H6MH-4ESL].
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at
515).
115. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
116. Id.
117. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (creating the undue burden standard); see
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (applying the undue burden standard to a law
requiring clinics to have hospital admitting privileges and hospital-grade
facilities); and see Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2113 (reaffirming the undue burden
caused by a Louisiana law that was almost identical to the Texas law from
Hellerstedt).
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woman seeking an abortion.118 Recently, shelter personnel within
the ORR were prohibited from taking any action to facilitate an
abortion for a detainee unless they had explicit written permission
from Lloyd himself.119 This means that immigrant women who
wanted to get an abortion would have to “extract[]”120 themselves
from ORR custody, find their own doctors, arrange for their own
transportation, and schedule their own procedures.121 These
physical, financial, and emotional hurdles rise to the level of an
undue burden as envisioned by the Supreme Court for any
immigrant woman, let alone a minor child seeking an abortion.122
Denying the right to access abortion “effectively denies the right
altogether.”123
In Doe’s specific case, Judge Patricia Millet of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals wrote a concurrence that addressed many of the
arguments made by anti-abortion proponents.124 She found the
government’s argument that it was not imposing a substantial
obstacle in the way of Jane Doe and her abortion to be ridiculous,
stating:
[T]he government[’s] . . . position [was] that . . . an unaccompanied
child, has the burden of extracting herself from [ORR] custody if she
wants to exercise the right to an abortion that the government does
not dispute that she has. The government has insisted that it may
categorically blockade exercise of her constitutional right unless this
child (like some kind of legal Houdini) figures her way out of
detention . . .125

Despite there being alternate routes — such as seeking sponsorship
or voluntary leaving the United States — Judge Millet noted that
these options were not viable, realistic, or worth the time to try.126
1. Sponsorship
A sponsor is an adult guardian, “much like a foster parent,
someone who chooses to house and provide for a child throughout
her time in the United States.”127 Judge Millet noted that Doe’s
sponsorship search had already been ongoing for nearly seven
weeks with no real leads.128 The sponsor would have to “either be
related to [Doe] or have some ‘bona fide social relationship’ with

118. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
119. Cancryn & Rayasam, supra note 67; Hargan 874 F.3d at 743.
120. Hargan 874 F.3d at 737 (Millet, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 737, 740-41.
122. Casey, 505 U.S. at 920.
123. Amici Brief, supra note 105, at 13.
124. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 736-43 (Millet, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 737 (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 738-41.
127. Id. at 738.
128. Id.

2022] The Supreme Mistake: When a Choice is Really No Choice at All

83

[her] that ‘existed before’ her arrival in the United States.”129
Additionally, the government said that the sponsor would help Doe
make the ultimate decision regarding her pregnancy.130 However,
Doe had already obtained a judicial bypass order from a Texas court
that would allow her to make that decision entirely on her own,
despite being a minor.131 Therefore, her sponsor would not have a
say in the decision anyway.132 Ultimately, Judge Millet argued that
the sponsorship search was just eating away valuable time in Doe’s
pregnancy.133
2. Voluntary Departure
Second, Doe could voluntarily leave the United States and
return to her home country.134 Judge Millet pointed out that this
was not an option for Doe, as returning to her home country would
mean a return to “life-threatening physical abuse.” 135 Additionally,
agreeing to voluntary departure also meant agreeing to give up any
and all potential claims of legal entitlement to stay in the United
States, even as a refugee.136 Judge Millet wrote that the only reason
that the government pushed these two options was because
“sponsorship, like voluntary departure from the United States,
would get [Doe] and her pregnancy out of the government’s
hands.”137 These arguments, appeals, and delays by the government
were not only impacting Doe’s health and the potential
complications of her abortion, but more importantly, they were
creating an undue burden preventing Doe from obtaining the
abortion she sought.138
To promote public health for all individuals in the United
States, healthcare information and services should be widely
accessible and available.139 In particular, “[a]ccess to accurate,
unbiased [reproductive] health information and comprehensive
[reproductive] healthcare services is essential to preserving [the]
health, dignity, and bodily autonomy [of women].”140 Studies have
shown that “restricting abortion is detrimental, while supportive
policies are beneficial to women.”141 Overall, when the interests of

129. Id.
130. Id. at 753 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
131. Id. at 739 (Millet, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 742.
136. Id. at 739.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 741.
139. Amici Brief, supra note 105, at 21.
140. Id.
141. Abortion restrictions can lead to poor emotional and financial wellbeing and prevent women from achieving their life plans and goals. Terri-Ann
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and harms to the State are balanced with the interests of and harm
to immigrant women, advocates argue that the interests of women
outweigh the potential harm to the State.142 Immigrant women
have an interest in their own bodily autonomy and in exercising
their constitutional right to obtain an abortion.143 By denying them
this right, the State’s interest in protecting a fetus becomes
irrelevant because the government’s actions “cannot be considered
a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”144

B. Arguments Against Preserving Abortion Access for
Immigrant Women
Anti-abortion proponents disagree wholeheartedly with prochoice advocates. Right off the bat, anti-abortion proponents would
argue that cases like Doe’s are moot. A case must have the
controversy or issue be ongoing throughout all stages of the
litigation, or else the case becomes meaningless.145 Because Doe was
able to have an abortion before her case made it to the Supreme
Court, her case was now pointless.146 She could no longer request
Thompson & Jane Seymour, Evaluating Priorities: Measuring Women’s &
Children’s Health & Well-Being Against Abortion Restrictions in the States, I BIS
R EPROD .
H EALTH
&
C TR .
F OR
R EPROD .
R IGHTS
(2017),
www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/USPAIbis-Evaluating-Priorities-v2.pdf [perma.cc/3BQ5-H2HU]. Women who cannot
obtain abortions are at a higher risk for poverty, physical health impairments,
and intimate partner violence. Id. On the other hand, studies have shown that
access to abortion can contribute to improved health and safety, lower risk of
poverty, and better outcomes for children as well. Id. Immigrant women are
already less likely to finish high school than native-born Americans, and they
experience higher rates of poverty. Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Women and
Girls in the United States, M IGRATION P OL ’ Y I NST . (Mar. 4, 2020),
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-women-and-girls-united-states2018 [perma.cc/87RN-H8DR]. Most importantly, immigrant women are more
likely to experience negative health outcomes, due in part to higher rates of
stress and trauma and lower rates of social support. Brian Karl Finch & William
A. Vega, Acculturation stress, social support, and self-rated health among
Latinos in California, 5(3) J. I MMIGR . H EALTH 109-17 (2003). Oftentimes, they
have no medical records at all, or at least no access to their medical records from
their home country. Susan L. Ivey & Shotsy Faust, Immigrant women’s health:
initial clinical assessment, 174(6) W EST J. M ED 433-37 (2001). It is clear that
immigrant women need access to healthcare, including reproductive healthcare,
just as much if not more than other groups of people. Id.
142. Thompson & Seymour, supra note 141.
143. Id.; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (holding that “[a]liens, even aliens
whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as
‘persons’ guaranteed due process of the law by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
144. Brief for Appellees at 47, Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (2017) (No. 185093).
145. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 87-9.
146. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792; see also generally DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974) (finding a case involving a law student admission controversy
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an abortion because she was no longer pregnant.147 The relief she
sought was already obtained, so there was no live issue or
controversy.148
They may also claim that immigrant women have no right to
an abortion at all because they are not U.S. citizens and are
undocumented.149 While abortion jurisprudence states that the
government cannot set up substantial obstacles in the way of
accessing abortion, there is also no obligation on the government to
expend resources to facilitate the process either.150 The government
may, in fact, actively adopt policies that “favor life.”151 Proponents
argue that this refusal to facilitate does not constitute an undue
burden for immigrant women because there are other options
available if they wish to terminate their pregnancies.152 These
options again include sponsorship and voluntary departure.153
1. Sponsorship
The first option that immigrant women have is to find a
sponsor, who is essential for protecting minors from human
trafficking, sexual abuse, and those who would abuse or neglect
them.154 Although the process of securing a sponsor can sometimes
take several weeks or months, it is a viable option for immigrant
women like Doe.155 In fact, the Supreme Court has previously
upheld state laws that created three-week delays before abortions,
so the potential time delay is not a constitutional problem here.156
If an immigrant woman can get sponsorship, she can leave ORR
moot because the student bringing the suit was already set to graduate from
law school in just a few weeks’ time); and see also generally Moore v. Madigan,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146304 (C.D. Ill. 2013) (declining to hear a concealed
carry case because of the passing of a state law legalizing concealed carry, which
rendered the case moot).
147. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792.
148. Id.
149. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 746-48 (LeCraft Henderson, J., dissenting).
150. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980); see also Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (stating that the government does not
need to “commit any resources to facilitating abortions” in a decision about state
restrictions on the use of state funds, facilities, and employees in performing or
advising about abortions).
151. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 16-7, Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018)
(No. 18-5093); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-74 (1977) (holding that
unequal government subsidization for childbirth and abortion was
constitutional).
152. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 151, at 14.
153. Id.
154. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 738-39 (Millet, J., concurring).
155. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 151, at 18.
156. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514, 532
(1990). In this case, the Court held that Ohio’s judicial bypass procedures met
the “expedition” requirement, even though the procedures could take threeweeks due to court scheduling and administrative logistics. Id.
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custody expeditiously157 and obtain her abortion once she is in the
custody of the sponsor.158 In Doe’s case, her adult sponsor could help
her weigh her options and make the right decision regarding her
pregnancy.159
2. Voluntary Departure
The second option is voluntary departure, where immigrant
women return to their home countries to access abortion services
because the U.S. government has no obligation to provide those
services in the United States.160 Instead of exercising a “right” to
access an abortion, they can exercise their right to voluntary
departure.161 This is not interpreted as punishment, but rather as
“simply an alien’s return to her country of nationality, where she
likely resided until just a short time before coming [to the U.S.]”162
Anti-abortion advocates warn of “abortion tourism,” where the idea
is that minors enter the United States seeking abortion services
that are not available in their own country, creating a strain on U.S.
judicial systems, immigration facilities, and medical resources.163
Allowing this practice presents clear concerns with respect to
foreign affairs and national security.164 The United States cannot
be known around the world as a haven for those seeking to
circumvent the laws of their home countries,165 and voluntary
departure would prevent all of these problems.166
157. Judge Kavanaugh explains that “expeditiously” should be defined for
future cases as a combination of “(i) expeditious from the time the Government
learns of the pregnant minor’s desire to have an abortion and (ii) expeditious in
the sense that the transfer to the sponsor does not occur too late in the
pregnancy for a safe abortion to occur.” Hargan, 874 F.3d at 753 (Kavanaugh,
J. dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 151, at 19; Robert Pear, Do Migrant
Teenagers Have Abortion Rights? Two Volatile Issues Collide in Court, N.Y.
T IMES (Sept. 29, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/us/politics/courtabortion-immigrants.html [perma.cc/WTJ8-WHG4]; see also Meagan Burrows,
Trump Administration Claims Preventing Young Immigrants from Accessing
Abortion
is
Constitutional,
ACLU
(Sept.
27,
2018),
www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-freedom/abortion/trump-administrationclaims-preventing-young-immigrants-accessing
[perma.cc/AV7B-LHQZ]
(explaining the Trump Administration’s argument that the U.S. government
has no obligation to provide immigrant women with an abortion).
161. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 151, at 20.
162. Id.
163. Appellant’s Brief at 45, Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018) (No. 185093); see also Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 151, at 20-21 (discussing the
possibility of this court decision leading to an increase in such “tourism”).
164. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 165, at 45.
165. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 151, at 20-21.
166. In 1972, the year before Roe legalized abortion in all states, 100,000
women travelled to New York City to obtain abortions because of New York’s
relaxed abortion laws. Jordan Larson, The 200-Year Fight for Abortion Access,
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Similarly, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh167 said in his D.C.
Circuit dissent that allowing Doe to obtain an abortion in this
instance would lead to “unlawful immigrant minors [having access
to] immediate abortion on demand.”168 Abortion jurisprudence in
this country already limits the means by which lawful citizens can
access an abortion, so anti-abortion proponents argue that creating
a narrower exception that allows access specifically for minor
immigrant women is unjustified.169

C. The Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
Jane Doe’s case finally came up before the U.S. Supreme Court
in the fall term of 2017.170 On June 4, 2018, the Court published its
decision, stating that Doe’s abortion, which she had on October 25,
2017, rendered her claim moot.171 Additionally, the Court vacated
the D.C. Circuit’s grant of injunctive relief to Doe.172 In its per
curiam opinion, the Court wrote “[w]hen ‘a civil case from a court in
the federal system . . . has become moot while on its way here,’ this
Court’s ‘established practice’ is ‘to reverse or vacate the judgment
below and remand with a direction to dismiss.’”173 But they also
noted that not every moot case should automatically be vacated too
— it ultimately depends on the circumstances of each case.174
However, the Court should vacate where “mootness occurs through
. . . the ‘unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower
court.’”175 The Court said that this is because it cannot allow a
plaintiff who won her case to take voluntary action that moots the
issue and then also reaps the benefits of that judgment in her
CUT (Jan. 17, 2017), www.thecut.com/2017/01/timeline-the-200-year-fight-forabortion-access.html [perma.cc/3X9Y-6NJR]. Half of those women reportedly
travelled more than 500 miles for the procedure. Id.
167. At the time of his dissenting opinion in Jane Doe’s case, Brett
Kavanaugh was a Judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. He has since been
appointed by President Trump to the U.S. Supreme Court, and he was
confirmed by the U.S. Senate on October 6, 2018, despite numerous allegations
of sexual assault that were levied against him. Marie Solis, Kavanaugh
Confirmed to the Supreme Court Despite Sexual Assault Allegations, V ICE (Oct.
6,
2018),
www.vice.com/en/article/9k7zey/kavanaugh-confirmed-to-thesupreme-court-despite-sexual-assault-allegations [perma.cc/22MM-TE3Y].
168. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 755 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
169. Id.
170. No. 17-654, S UPREME C OURT OF THE U.S., www.supremecourt.gov/
search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-654.html
[perma.cc/8Q93-QH6K] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
171. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792.
172. Id. at 1793.
173. Id. at 1792 (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,
39 (1950)).
174. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792-93.
175. Id. at 1792 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 71-2 (1997) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,
513 U.S. 18, 23 (1944))).
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favor.176 Yet the very same Court has previously held that the
mootness doctrine does not apply in cases involving pregnancy and
abortion.177 In conclusion, the Supreme Court erred when it
rendered Doe’s case moot and vacated the D.C. Circuit’s en banc
decision, putting a decisive end to Doe’s case. Additionally, the
Court failed to respond to the constitutional question presented in
the underlying case, namely “whether the government can violate
decades of Supreme Court precedent by banning abortion for
unaccompanied minors.”178

IV. PROPOSAL
Immigrant women in this country, even if they are
undocumented, have a constitutional right to access an abortion.179
However, due to political jockeying,180 systemic racism and
misogyny,181 and the high number of conservative judges in this
country appointed by President Trump,182 this right is being
contested by anti-abortion advocates.183 If the Supreme Court had
heard Jane Doe’s case back in 2018, and if it had ruled that ORR’s
policy presented an undue burden on her right to an abortion, then
176. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792 (quoting Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 75).
177. See Section II, Part A of this Comment (outlining the mootness
exception to abortion cases).
178. Brigitte Amiri, Young Immigrant Women Have the Right to Access
Abortion. Monday’s Supreme Court Decision Doesn’t Change That., ACLU (June
4, 2018), www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-freedom/abortion/young-immigrantwomen-have-right-access-abortion-mondays-supreme [perma.cc/GZR3-ZP2M].
The government policy in question has been called “a blanket ban on abortion
for anyone while they’re in government custody.” Zoe Tillman, The Trump
Administration Is Still Trying To Stop Pregnant Undocumented Teens From
Getting
Abortions,
B UZZFEED
N EWS
(Sept.
26,
2018),
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/trump-administration-stopundocumented-teens-abortion [perma.cc/JG3K-VSDS].
179. See Section III, Part A of this Comment (outlining arguments made by
pro-choice advocates).
180. Mainstreaming Hate: The Anti-Immigrant Movement in the U.S., A NTI D EFAMATION L EAGUE (last visited Nov. 22, 2020), www.adl.org/the-antiimmigrant-movement-in-the-us [perma.cc/9A2U-XDE9].
181. Surina Khan, White Supremacy Is Rooted In Misogyny And Racism,
W OMEN ’ S F OUND . C A . (Aug. 25, 2017), www.womensfoundca.org/news/whitesupremacy-rooted-misogyny-racism/ [perma.cc/HQ4G-JVKC].
182. Kadhim Shubber, How Trump has already transformed America’s
courts, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020), www.ft.com/content/032b3101-9b8b-4566ace4-67b86f42370b. President Trump has made 217 judicial appointments in
during his presidency, most of whom are white men. John Gramlich, How
Trump compares with other recent presidents in appointing federal judges, P EW
R SCH . C TR . (July 15, 2020), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/15/howtrump-compares-with-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges
[perma.cc/ZAL3-NFPD]. President Trump’s appointees make up twenty-four
percent of all active federal judges currently presiding in the United States as
of 2020. Id.
183. What’s going on?, supra note 9.
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the reproductive rights of immigrant women would not be up for
decision today. If the Supreme Court had followed its own wellestablished precedent, then it would be clear that immigrant
women have just as much bodily autonomy as women who are
American citizens. We would likely not be hearing chilling tales of
forced hysterectomies in Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) detention centers in Georgia,184 outright denials of abortion
access,185 and women giving birth under inhumane and unsanitary
conditions.186 The Supreme Court in 2018 should have first heard
Jane Doe’s case; and second, ruled that ORR’s policy created an
undue burden for immigrant women seeking abortions.
Part A of this section will explain why the U.S. Supreme Court
made a mistake and should have heard Jane Doe’s case. Part B will
propose that the Supreme Court should have ruled that the ORR’s
policy created an undue burden on immigrant women’s ability to
obtain abortions. Finally, Part C will discuss the importance of the
Supreme Court taking up this issue and ruling in such a way, due
to its effect on solidifying abortion jurisprudence and protecting
immigrant women’s right to choose to terminate their pregnancy.

A. The Supreme Court Should Have Accepted Jane
Doe’s Case
In a per curiam decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
Jane Doe’s case was moot, and therefore, it was not going to discuss
any of the very real and very pertinent issues presented by Doe, like
whether ORR’s policies violated the undue burden standard from
Casey.187 However, as written by Justice Blackmun into the fabric
of Roe v. Wade, the mootness doctrine does not apply to cases
involving pregnancy and abortion because they are wrongs “capable
of repetition, yet evading review.”188 Unfortunately, Doe’s situation
is all too common, and many women share a similar plight.189 In
fact, Doe was only one of several plaintiffs in her suit; Jane Roe,
Jane Poe, and Jane Moe joined her because they too could not obtain
the abortions they wanted due to ORR policy.190 While each of the
four girls came to the United States under different circumstances,
they each were pregnant while in ORR custody, requested

184. Treisman, supra note 1.
185. Amiri, supra note 77.
186. O’Connor, supra note 79.
187. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1791.
188. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at
515).
189. Brief for Appellees, supra note 144, at 8-13.
190. Id. Additionally, the caption for this case lists the appellees as
“ROCHELLE GARZA, as guardian ad litem to unaccompanied minor JANE
DOE, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, et al.[]” (emphasis
added). Azar, 138 S. Ct. at caption.
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abortions, and were denied by the same policy enacted by ORR
Director Scott Lloyd.191 Additionally, since the Supreme Court
handed down this ruling, there have been several subsequent
plaintiffs repeatedly bringing essentially the same suit. 192
In this case, the fact that Doe had already gotten an abortion
may indeed have negated her personal claim of injunctive relief,193
but there was still a need to discuss and make a decision about the
right at issue – that being the right of an unaccompanied,
undocumented, immigrant minor to obtain an abortion, if she so
chooses. However, in order to have this discussion and decision, the
Court must first have accepted the case, which it incorrectly failed
to do.

B. The Supreme Court Should Have Ruled That ORR’s
Policy Created an Undue Burden
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court defined an undue
burden as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus.” 194 Under Director Scott Lloyd, the
ORR’s policy on abortion stated that shelter personnel were
“prohibited from taking any action that facilitates an abortion
without direction and approval from the [ORR] Director.”195
Predictably, these requests were almost always denied.196 This
policy ultimately amounted to an undue burden that stood in the
way of immigrant women, like Doe, who wanted to obtain an
abortion while in ORR custody.197 ORR’s policy did not allow Doe to
leave their custody, let alone leave to have an abortion.198 She did
have two options presented to her by the government: finding a
sponsor or voluntarily departing the United States and returning to
her home country.199 However, neither was a reasonable or viable
option for Doe.200
Finding a sponsor would have a negligible effect on her ability
to get an abortion, as she had already obtained a judicial bypass
from a Texas judge that allowed her to decide for herself, even as a
191. Id. at 8-13.
192. Garza v. Hargan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209883 (D.C. December 18,
2017); J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019); ACLU v. Azar, No. 16-cv03539-LB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175470 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2018); ACLU of N.
Cal. v. Burwell, No. 16-cv-03539-LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168352 (N.D. Cal.
Oct 11, 2017).
193. Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1792.
194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
195. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 744 (LeCraft Henderson, J., dissenting).
196. Stuart, supra note 74.
197. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 737 (Millet, J., concurring).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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minor, whether to get an abortion.201 While it is true that a sponsor
would allow her to leave ORR custody to obtain that abortion, it
simply would take too long to locate and fully process the
sponsorship.202 On average, sponsorship applications take six to
twelve months to process.203 For Doe, who was already in her second
trimester when she had her abortion, such a delay represented a
risk to her health, higher complexity of the abortion procedure, and
the greater difficulty of finding a doctor in Texas who would perform
the procedure.204 And without a massive expedition of her
sponsorship, such a delay would have condemned Doe to childbirth.
This delay is unnecessary and presents an undue burden on Doe’s
right to have an abortion.
Doe’s second option, voluntary departure, was the government
essentially saying, “Go back where you came from if you don’t like
the fact that we are violating your constitutional rights.”205 This
option would have forced her to “surrender any legal right she has
to stay in the United States” and return to her home country, where
she faced severe abuse from her family.206 Moreover, her home
country prohibited abortion, so the closest — and only — place she
would be able to legally undergo the procedure was in the United
States.207 The voluntary departure option left Doe with two choices:
carrying her pregnancy to term or death. These choices practically
left Doe with no choice at all, and under Casey, this burden is both
too severe and lacking in any “legitimate, rational justification.”208
Therefore, ORR’s policy presents an undue burden on Doe’s right to
access an abortion.

C. It is Vitally Important for Immigrant Women’s
Rights for the Supreme Court to Rule on This Issue
Though the Supreme Court should have heard Doe’s case and
ruled that she had a constitutional right to an abortion, it did not.
The decades of abortion jurisprudence clearly support immigrant
women’s right to terminate their pregnancies if they so choose.209
However, more liberal justices on the Court, including Justices
Steven Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,210 Elena Kagan, and Sonia
201. Id. at 739.
202. Id. at 738.
203. Family-Based Green Card Processing Time, VISANATION, www.immiusa.com/family-based-green-card/processing-time
[perma.cc/86GH-7MQH]
(last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
204. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 741 (Millett, J., concurring).
205. Burrows, supra note 162.
206. Hargan, 874 F.3d at 737, 740 (Millett, J., concurring).
207. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 165, at 45.
208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
209. See Section III, Part A of this Comment (outlining arguments made by
pro-choice advocates).
210. Justice Ginsburg is no longer on the court, as she passed away in late
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Sotomayor, could have seen that, despite having the law on their
side, there simply were not enough votes on the court to win a
majority opinion in favor of immigrant women having access to
abortions.211 Because both sides saw an uphill battle to getting what
they wanted out of Doe’s case, they took the easy way out and
declined to hear her case altogether.212
However, this is unacceptable behavior from the Court. The
Supreme Court is supposed to apply judicial review to laws, policies,
and regulations and determine if they are in line with the
Constitution.213 But the Court is supposed to “apply the law with
only justice in mind, and not electoral or political concerns.”214 Here,
both liberal and conservative justices determined that Doe’s plight,
which is a common plight for many immigrant women being held in
government custody here in the United States, was not quite the
right fit to serve their own political agendas. So, they discarded her
and her case, leaving justice for another day. But “justice too long
delayed is justice denied.”215 Because Doe did not receive her justice
in 2018, many immigrant women and girls that came after her have
had their justices denied as well. Given the humanitarian crisis on
the U.S. southern border and the institution of an ORR policy in
clear conflict with abortion jurisprudence, the Court should have
taken this case.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court made a mistake and should have heard
Jane Doe’s case. They then should have ruled that the ORR’s policy
created an undue burden on immigrant women’s ability to obtain
abortions in violation of the Constitution. We have recently seen
that women’s rights to bodily autonomy are under attack in this
country, which particularly affects women of color and women who
are immigrants. From mass hysterectomies in Georgia ICE
detention centers216 to the vigilante law in Texas,217 the rights and
liberties of women to decide what to do with their own bodies are
hanging in the balance. Justice O’Connor once said, “Liberty finds
no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”218 The Supreme Court, in
declining to hear Doe’s case, missed a chance to clear up that doubt,
make a necessary statement about the constitutionality of these
rights and liberties, and reaffirm their importance. Because the
Court has been swinging farther right in the past few years, Doe’s
case may have been the Court’s last chance to do so. Doing so would
have strengthened Roe with another reaffirmation of the case’s
central holding. Doing so would have solidified the fact that
abortion laws explicitly include immigrant women, immigrant
minors, and those in immigration custody. And doing so would have
said, loud and clear, that immigrant women’s bodies are their own.
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